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THE POLITICS OF ENMITY:
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEW NEOCONSERVATISM
Robin MOOKERJEE1
ABSTRACT:  ▪ In Specters of  Marx, Derrida turns his attention to the “spectral” 
impulse in Marx and ﬁ nds time to chide neoconservative theorist Francis 
Fukuyama for his “messianic” leanings. This episode highlights the problematic 
character of  Derrida’s relationship to competing political persuasions. Since the 
writing of  Specters, French theory, through its inﬂ uence on discourses around 
identity and postcolonialism, has contributed to the increased polarization of  
America’s political spectrum. With Derrida’s notion of  “messianism” as a starting 
point, this essay examines recent neoconservative works. Due to the tendency 
of  academic intellectuals to eschew a clear subject position, conservative 
intellectuals have stepped out of  conversation with the left and turned their 
attention to Europe. Their recent polemics either withdraw from Fukuyama’s 
messianic historicism, viewing it as the province of  an endemically “fascist” left, 
or reclaim messianism with the diagnosis of  a European “illness.” Through such 
a diagnosis, these authors have found a tangible enemy in Europe’s relatively 
traditional political culture. At the same time, they have projected the “moral 
relativism” of  America’s deconstructive academy onto the Continental political 
establishment.
KEYWORDS ▪ : Deconstruction. Politics. Neoconservatism. Messianism. 
Historicism.
Academic and literary practices such as deconstruction have little direct eff ect 
on political culture. However, the perceived moral relativism and the actual anti-
subjective elements embodied in deconstructive thought became, over the course 
of  the last two decades, assimilated into the diverse views of  the intellectual left. It 
has contributed to an increasing detachment between progressive and conservative 
thought in spite, or because of  the politically ambiguous nature of  Derridean 
philosophy.
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Before turning to recent neoconservatism, it seems appropriate therefore 
to discuss one of  the only face-to-face encounters between a neoconservative 
philosopher and a French poststructuralist. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of  History 
and the Last Man, published during the movement’s nascency, borrowed Hegelian 
progressivism from the left and drew criticism from Derrida in Specters of  Marx for 
its “messianism.” Derrida’s critique was perhaps oddly located in an argument that 
Marx remains, in Christopher Wise’s paraphrase, “trapped within in an ontology of  
presence” (WISE, 2001, p.57). In “Deconstruction and Zionism” Wise reviews this 
latest skirmish between Derrida and his Marxist critics, ﬁ nding the critics largely 
peremptory or superﬁ cial in the dismissals collected in Michael Sprinker’s Ghostly 
Demarcations. However, the question of  messianicity remains troubling for Wise, and 
leads him to call Derrida’s political affi  liations, questioned often enough in the past, 
into question. The religious quality to which Derrida alludes should in no way be 
regarded as clearly understandable; Derrida (2002, p.234) admits as much in Marx 
& Sons. In Deconstruction in a Nutshell, Derrida describes messianicity as a universal 
but elusive – and clearly religious – aspect of  human experience: “As soon as you 
address the other, as soon as you are open to the future…. waiting for someone 
to come: that is the opening of  experience” (DERRIDA; CAPUTO, 1996, p.22). 
In Specters, Derrida (1993, p.166) shows a straightforward respect for the religious, 
deﬁ ned as a discreet experience and derogates the reduction of  religion to ideology 
by the false messianicity of  Marx, Fukuyama, or the Abrahamic traditions. It would 
be all too easy to conﬂ ate Derrida’s criticism of  Fukuyama with other leftist critics 
of  liberalism. However, Derridean theology is incompatible with liberalism for the 
same reason that it is inimical to Marx’s ontology of  presence. It is not historicism 
per se Derrida objects to, but Hegelian dialectic which, even in its spiritual form, 
requires an investment in this same identity or presence. In a classic study, William 
Dean (1986, p.48) distinguishes Derrida from the “Yale school” and much of  the 
deconstructive movement and allies him with the American pragmatists or process 
philosophers who “reject the Cartesian duality between the self  and the world”. 
Derrida’s rejection of  ideological historicism irrespective of  political affi  liation is 
an interesting note to those who continue to wring hands over the political uses or 
uselessness of  his philosophy2.
Whether or not a radically skeptical philosophy can provide a blueprint for 
political action, it may still aff ect the political culture within and outside of  the 
intellectual community. Derrida’s uncharacteristic engagement with a contemporary 
political pundit may have reﬂ ected a prescient awareness that his inﬂ uence was 
contributing to a polarized political culture. Damaged by De Man’s and Heidegger’s 
2 Most recently in Phing Cheah’s Derrida and the Time of the Political, 2009.
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ties to Nazism and upstaged by the neo-Marxist discourses around identity and 
colonialism, Derrida in the 1990s was in need of  politicization. Figures such as 
Richard Beardsworth framed Derridean skepticism as an implicative critique 
of  violent institutions, while Jon Simons and others did something similar for 
Foucault. In French Theory François Cusset (2008) tells the story of  the astounding 
inﬂ uence of  theory on popular culture, consumerism, and worldwide academic 
discourse. He reports, also, on the concomitant and perhaps resultant separation 
between intellectual culture and mainstream political culture. While, in the tradition 
of  Frankfurt School Marxists, cultural critics identiﬁ ed the authoritarianism 
and pathology evident in cultural products and texts, the philosophical tenets of  
poststructuralist theory were seen to undermine the real world relevance of  this 
critique. This perceived irrelevance was a direct result of  the Derridean avoidance of  
a Cartesian subject. Activists such as Todd Gitlin complained that without a belief  in 
“people” or “peoples” there could be no political left. Political philosophers such as 
Michael Walzer deplored the pluralism of  Derrida and Foucault, which threatened to 
rob politics of  its object (CUSSET, 2008, p.188). Leftist politics deteriorated, Cusset 
writes, into a sort of  atomism, a balkanized world of  independent interest groups 
without a unifying ideology.
The cause to be championed, singular, complete, and irreducible, off ers the 
comfort of  constant recognition and gratitude, and mutual complicity, and 
contrasts with the alienation of  the social market, foundation of  the real-
life world. This perspective favored a strictly culturalist reading of  social 
struggles and international conﬂ icts, casting it as a confrontation between 
essences, ahistorical realities among which cultural diff erences were seen 
as insurmountable and incommensurable – a notion that sometimes, 
paradoxically, came to pave the way for right-wing arguments from writers 
like Samuel Huntington about the “clash of  civilizations. (CUSSET, 2008, 
p.189).
Huntington’s Manichean outlook, Cusset argues, was a mirror image of  the 
multicultural vision of  the world in which underprivileged “identities” were opposed 
to a white male norm. Since the minority groups made no claim of  ontological 
presence, they lacked Gitlin’s sense of  authenticity as “peoples” and lacked Walzer’s 
necessary “object”. Such a hybrid extension of  Derridean theory with traditional 
leftist ideas was formulated in an attempt to remain true to the Heideggerian sense 
of  the subject as described by William Dean (1986), one which never speaks of  the 
subject qua subject, distinct from the other. The underpinning of  French theory in 
New Left politics may have served as an assurance that its discourse would never 
give way to a false (i.e. collective) messianism. But its cultural inﬂ uence set the stage 
for a collectivist and indeed Hegelian-historicist discourse on the right, one that was 
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hospitable to white males who, as Cusset writes, would be racist and sexist by deﬁ nition 
from the perspective of  multiculturalism.
Derrida has always been useful to critics on the right who detest the deterioration 
of  traditional or liberal values in American culture. “Moral relativism” or “cultural 
relativism” are almost euphemistic references to Derrida and pursuant philosophers, 
worked to exhaustion by critics like Roger Kimball, who published Tenured Radicals 
the same year that The End of  History and the Last Man came out. Over ﬁ fteen years 
after the term “culture wars” came into common usage, neoconservatism was 
widely understood to be failed political philosophy. Even Fukuyama, who based his 
paradigm on the widely accepted failure of  communism, had distanced himself  from 
neoconservatism’s political manifestation. As the Iraq war faced increasing criticism, 
Fukuyama’s descendants had few options. The Hegelian sense of  an inevitable end 
of  historical strife and a worldwide acceptance of  democratic liberalism had failed to 
materialize. Like disappointed Marxists in the wake of  World War I, they could turn 
their attention to the cultural factors that may have inhibited the march of  history. 
Many authors turned their attention to Europe. Reversing Adorno’s model of  The 
Authoritarian Personality, they saw it as a dispirited culture, incapable of  exercising 
power when necessary. These thinkers saw a failure of  Hegelian historicism to assert 
itself  on the Continent. Others, returning somewhat to classical liberalism, rejected 
the Hegelian notion of  evolution as inherently akin to fascism or totalitarianism. 
They rejected the notion that fascism was necessarily a phenomenon of  the political 
right. While such a perspective was not overtly at odds with Derrida’s critique of  
Fukuyama, some authors found time to revisit deconstruction’s links to Nazism. 
One bestselling historian, Jonah Goldberg of  the National Review, viewed Derrida’s 
intellectual lineage as inherently fascist.
In 1966, at a conference at Johns Hopkins University, the French literary 
critic Jacques Derrida introduced the term “Deconstruction” — a term 
coined by Nazi ideologues — into the American intellectual bloodstream. 
Deconstruction, a literary theory which holds there is no single meaning 
to any text, caught ﬁ re in the minds of  academics and students alike who 
hoped to be liberated from the dead weight of  accumulated history and 
knowledge… Derrida hoped to snatch the veil from the Enlightenment 
and reveal the tyranny of  “logocentrism” (another word with fascist roots). 
This, too, was a replay of  the pragmatic spirit which had sought to liberate 
humanity from inherited dogma. Pragmatism inspired Woodrow Wilson, 
Franklin Roosevelt, and Benito Mussolini, as well as their court intellectuals, 
to discard the ‘putrefying corpse’ of  classical liberalism… As one progressive 
reformer put it, ‘We were all Deweyites before we read Dewey. Many in the 
academy were deoconstructionists before they read Derrida. (GOLDBERG, 
2009, p.149).
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Where progressives had sometimes viewed Derridean thought as undermining the 
object relations necessary for political thought and action, Goldberg sees it as an overtly 
political revolutionary gesture. This makes sense, since, as an essentially “negative” 
perspective which proposes nothing and yet clears the way for a messianic openness 
to experience and the future, it is resistant to any formulation, whether traditional, 
liberal, or progressive. Goldberg sees deconstruction as Roger Kimball and others 
did: as a hostile gesture towards already-established truths, and a deeply antinomian 
perspective. His concern is with intellectual lineage, and philosophical pragmatism, 
in his book Liberal Fascism, is the shared root of  Italian fascism, Nazism, Wilsonian 
progressivism, and Roosevelt’s authoritarian politics. It is not merely that pragmatism 
views “truth” as to some extent contingent. As in the case of  deconstruction, for 
Goldberg, it is the pernicious and cynical uses to which pragmatist philosophy 
can be put that are powerful. Both Mussolini and Hitler, Goldberg writes, viewed 
themselves as creating a pseudo-religion. Inspired by the success of  Bolshevism and 
understanding the power of  a Darwinian and Hegelian model of  social progress, 
Hitler, inﬂ uenced by Nietzsche and William James via Georges Sorel, also understood 
that “truth” could be manufactured. From Mussolini, whom he despised as much 
as he did the Bolsheviks, Hitler learned that it was the emotive content of  political 
discourse that made it eff ective, not its philosophical coherence. For Goldberg all 
forms of  state-centered progressivism possess this pragmatist cynicism and Hegelian 
historicism. They are manufactured pseudo-religious ideologies, extremely resistant 
to alternative perspectives (such as libertarianism or conservatism). Deconstruction 
in America was, during the upheaval of  the 1960s, merely a way of  jettisoning those 
perspectives from academic discourse.
A popular misuse of  the word could serve to label Goldberg “deconstructive” 
rather than messianic. He decries Hegelian historicism in all its forms, and, like 
Derrida, appears to ﬁ nd fault with them for their false claim to religiosity. However, 
Goldberg, whose neoconservatism resembles classical liberalism or libertarianism, 
does not defer to traditional, institutional religion. He is, however, to some extent 
an anti-messianic organicist, one who views most or all progressivist theories as 
false contrivances. Their roots in pragmatism may be an indication that they are 
fabrications, the product of  a relativistic view of  truth, but Goldberg, engaged in 
a broad partisan critique, does not question his own epistemological assumptions. 
Where Goldberg sees Hitler’s philosophy as fundamentally anti-intellectual, 
Derrida, in Of  Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, seems to view Nazism as an inevitable 
consequence of  the philosophical tradition.
We have here a program and a combinatory whose power remains abyssal. In 
all rigor it exculpates none of  the discourses which can thus exchange their 
power. It leaves no place open for any arbitrating authority. Nazism was not 
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born in the desert. We all know this, but it must be constantly recalled. And 
even if, far from any desert, it had grown like a mushroom in the shadow of  
big trees, in the shelter of  their silence or their indiff erence but in the same 
soil. (DERRIDA, 1991, p.138-139).
In Deconstruction and the Ethical Turn Peter Baker (1995, p.127) interprets this poetical 
passage. “The ‘impossible’ ethics of  deconstruction, however, demands that one 
continue to think about the issues in their full, abysslike complexity that denies 
any ﬁ rm ground on which to maintain one’s own lack of  involvement in the issues 
raised by the inquiry”. Derrida describes Nazism in organic terms; far from being an 
anomalous mutation, it is inseparable from a vast tradition of  philosophical tradition. 
Unlike the Abrahamic religions it is not the result of  a revelatory birth in the desert. 
The “abysslike” complexity of  Nazism, as well as its abysslike attractive power, so 
troubling to Frankfurt School Marxists, does not free individual interpreters or 
contiguous philosophical traditions from ethical responsibility, particularly not in the 
case of  their “silence” or “indiff erence.” Goldberg, perhaps revealing a conservative 
tendency toward scapegoating, sees post-World War I politics as the advent of  a 
viral authoritarianism that is now reaching epidemic proportions. Derrida, to 
extrapolate a bit from the passage quoted above, may see Nazism as an extreme and 
messianic extension of  the “ontology of  presence.” The conﬁ dent propositions of  
Fukuyama have given way to a negative theology that rejects all non-Enlightenment 
formulations as leading to tyranny. Both Derrida and Goldberg reject the authority 
of  most philosophical traditions; however, Goldberg (and Fukuyama) retain their 
faith in those that affi  rm the primacy of  the subject or the individual in society. In 
this they are fundamentally more consistent with Todd Gitlin or Michael Walzer, 
both of  whom see the need for a subject-object relationship in liberal or progressive 
politics. 
As we’ve seen through the juxtaposition of  Derrida with Goldberg, Derrida’s 
own negative theology, so described by a variety of  commentators, is elusive enough 
that it cannot be easily opposed to other traditions. There is some irony in this, since 
Goldberg’s very argument, once made by Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, 
is that communism and fascism are more like contentious siblings than nemeses. 
As a component of  academic leftist discourse, French theory tends to prevent that 
discourse, heavy-handedly moral as it often is, from playing a role in an ideological 
relationship. While “culture wars” appear to take place on the cultural playing ﬁ eld, 
they are characterized more by professed bewilderment on the part of  the right and, 
often, ad hominem attacks on the part of  the left. They may make one nostalgic for 
the relatively engaged quality of  Cold War-era debates, encounters between more-
or-less clearly deﬁ ned intellectual positions. Bewildered, perhaps, by their domestic 
enemies, neoconservatives have turned their attention to Europe. Goldberg’s thesis 
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may constitute a confession of  the failed messianism, or triumphalism, of  his 
creed, leading him to project these Hegelian tendencies onto the left and demonize 
them. In this way, he views America and Europe as similarly corrupt progressive/
fascist societies. By contrast, widely-read authors like Robert Kagan and Marc Steyn 
maintain the Hegelian or right-wing progressive framework, and view America and 
Europe as starkly opposed.
If  there is a stylistic opposite to deconstructive prose in contemporary 
discourse it may be found in the inﬂ uential writings of  neoconservatives such as 
Kagan and Steyn, whose bestselling pleas for the public to adopt a commonsensical 
neorealist position embody the forgotten tones of  the American Oxbridge 
intellectual: measured, exasperated, allusive, factual, anecdotal – the voice of  the 
Last Reasonable Man. Commentators who responded to Steyn’s America Alone with 
ad hominem dismissals as quaint as his witty prose seemed to resent his acerbic charm 
as if  it represented a kind of  old world sorcery. And Kagan’s Of  Power and Paradise 
concealed its defense of  the Bush Doctrine in the kind of  analytical, “objective” 
tones Roger Kimball identiﬁ ed as the paradigm of  scholarly professionalism lost 
by 1980s academics with the rise of  French theory. Due in part to his poker-faced 
presentation, Kagan won positive reviews from the “left-leaning” press worldwide. 
Both authors view America as monolithic and unique in its ability and 
willingness to wield military power against looming threats. Each bemoans the 
“post-nationalism” and paciﬁ sm of  the EU, Steyn attributing it to a low birthrate 
and general eff eminacy, Kagan seeing it as the inevitable result of  military weakness. 
Steyn sees a rising tide of  Islam, supported by increased violence and demographic 
trends, which threatens to transform European culture in a generation or two. Kagan 
sees the EU as dwelling in an admirable but essentially factitious paradise, Kantian in 
that it proposes a universal state, eschewing national divisions. America, meanwhile, 
having provided Europe with military backing throughout the Cold War and in more 
recent ﬂ are-ups, remains in a Hobbesian world, and, by continuing to defend the 
West against clashing civilizations, makes Europe’s paradise possible. Kagan makes 
no distinction between Democratic and Republican administrations, viewing all 
administrations since World War II as essentially guided by the exigencies of  power 
politics. Indeed, a recent Wall Street Journal opinion piece discusses the “neo-realism” 
of  Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton.
The unapologetic raison d’etat promoted by both authors would appear to 
represent the opposite of  the critique of  power developed by academics in the 
Americas and the UK over the past three decades. It is not simply an affi  rmation 
of  power, but a complaint against those who refuse to acknowledge its usefulness 
and effi  cacy. Although, seen from a global perspective far removed from textual 
ambiguities, America retains an undivided character for both authors, they still feel 
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the need to assert America’s identity as ineradicably distinct from that of  Europe. 
Writing in a tone of  good humor under duress, Steyn occasionally decries the “moral 
relativism” of  progressives or socialists in Europe. He writes to convince a liberal-
dominated public too caught up in the brain fog of  relativism (or, in his words, the 
“blancmange of  relativism”) of  some pressing realities. Yet this public in its American 
form, the one he knows will be unsympathetic to his narrative of  imminent Muslim 
domination, is barely acknowledged in his or Kagan’s books. Surely the America they 
describe, the last refuge of  unreﬂ ective action (and a healthy reproductive drive), 
would know itself  without the need for description – if  it ﬁ t that description. 
Possibly reﬂ ecting American parochialism, the authors’ vision of  Europe seems 
to be largely a projection of  homegrown preoccupations across the Atlantic. In spite 
of  their assumption of  American homogeneity, the weak and relativistic Europe 
they describe, hobbled by political correctness and an intrusive, semi-totalitarian 
bureaucracy, resembles nothing as much as Jonah Goldberg’s, Dinesh D’Souza’s, 
or Robert Levin’s view of  the United States. American civil libertarians are more 
likely to be concerned about London’s culture of  surveillance, an over-zealous 
measure to curb terrorism, than a Labor government that panders excessively to 
the sensitivities of  Muslims. Transplanting American debates about language and 
political correctness seldom heard overseas, Steyn notes that French news outlets 
referred to Muslim automobile arsonists as “youth,” neglecting to mention their 
religious affi  liation (GOLDBERG, 2009, p.34). However, a moment’s reﬂ ection 
should suffi  ce to remind us that neutral terms are nearly always used in reports 
of  crime worldwide. Echoing the classic conservative complaint that American 
Democrats are “soft on crime,” Kagan (2004, p.46-49) reports that NATO preferred 
negotiation to the use of  force during the multilateral war in Kosovo. Just as John 
Kerry was regarded as weak during the 2004 presidential election for recommending 
increased reliance on diplomacy, NATO’s reluctance to use decisive force is read by 
Kagan as the natural consequence of  military weakness, rather than as a strategic 
option. The EU’s failure to build a substantial military over the course of  the 1990s, 
in spite of  a GDP exceeding that of  the United States, was a matter of  consideration, 
not a failure of  courage. 
The neoconservative construction of  Europe reﬂ ects the tendency to create 
an antipodal “other” in the absence of  a domestic opponent who fully inhabits the 
subject position. Both Steyn and Kagan describe America as “alone,” irreversibly 
separate from Europe, its former companion, just as Jonah Goldberg sees 
conservatives as criminalized and excluded in a worldwide progressive conspiracy. 
They are describing a domestic situation: the loss of  an interlocutor with whom 
one can have a relationship. Steyn maintains the progressivism and messianism of  
Fukuyama, using a common tactic of  authoritarian statesmen. He declares that the 
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Western world faces unprecedented changes, and only America is in a position to 
ﬁ ght these changes. He describes Europe much the way Hitler described Germany 
in the 1930s: as weakened and humiliated, on the verge of  being deprived of  its 
ethnic integrity. Kagan sees in Europe a historical necessity for liberal Democrats 
to exercise power; but the Hegelian progress foretold by Fukuyama refuses to assert 
itself  due to some sort of  illness infecting Europe. Again, this position is a reversal of  
the Frankfurt School contention that those in opposition to progressivism suff ered 
from a sort of  pre-fascist psychological illness.
Cusset goes some way toward explaining this reanimation of  Cold War 
oppositions through his perception that, in spite of  the popularity of  French theory 
in America, the UK, and Australia, the intellectual culture of  Europe retained a 
distinct and opposable ﬂ avor. 
There are several important features that distinguish the latter from its 
American counterpart when it comes to French theory: a more extensive 
history of  public intellectuals, less of  a tendency to innovate for the sake of  
innovation, a greater measure of  clout held by Marxist academics, and, in a 
broader sense, the new sociopolitical paradigm of  social class that exists in 
France. (CUSSET, 2008, p.289).
The ontology of  presence had never entirely gone out of  fashion in the UK and, 
to a greater extent, on the Continent. Todd Gitlin had declared that the American 
left was in need of  both a sense of  its own “peoples” and an “object,” which may 
be either a goal or an enemy. European intellectuals, who resembled the traditional 
American left, had overcome their separate national identities and achieved an 
economic renaissance of  sorts. They no longer depended, as Robert Kagan notes, 
on the United States for military protection from the Soviet Union. Themselves 
in need of  an object, they directed their animus at the United States. American 
conservative intellectuals, many of  them descended from the old anti-Stalinist left, in 
turn found an object or enemy in the EU, one which embodied the familiar Marxist 
and anti-liberal philosophies. Partly due to the skeptical leanings of  French theory, 
American intellectuals, for all their cultural inﬂ uence, were left out of  the “real” 
political equation.
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RESUMO ▪ : Em Espectros de Marx, Derrida dedica sua atenção ao impulso “espectral”em 
Marx e encontra tempo ainda para censurar o teórico neoconservador Francis Fukuyama 
por suas tendências “messiânicas”. O episódio ajuda a evidenciar o caráter problemático da 
relação de Derrida com convicções políticas concorrentes. Desde a redação de Espectros, a 
French Theory, por meio de sua inﬂ uência sobre os discursos a respeito de identidade e pós-
colonialismo, vem contribuindo para aumentar a polarização do espectro político da América. 
Tendo por ponto de partida a noção de “messiansmo” como em Derrida, este artigo analisa 
trabalhos recentes de tendência neoconservadora. Devido à tendência dos intelectuais acadêmicos 
de se esquivar de uma clara posição individual, os intelectuais conservadores abandonaram o 
diálogo com a esquerda e voltaram sua atenção à Europa. Suas polêmicas mais recentes ou bem 
se afastam do historicismo messiânico de Fukuyama, que consideram como o reduto de uma 
esquerda endemicamente “fascista”, ou reabilitam o messianismo sob o diagnóstico de uma 
“doença” européia. Esse diagnóstico permite que tais autores encontrem um inimigo tangível 
na cultura política relativamente tradicional da Europa. Ao mesmo tempo, eles projetam o 
“relativismo moral” do pensamento americano acadêmico de caráter desconstrucionsista por 
sobre o establishment político do continente.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE ▪ : Desconstrução. Política. Neoconservadorismo. Messianismo. 
Historicismo.
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